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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
VOLUiME 8 SPRNG, 1972 Num'ni 1
THE HISTORY OF THE ENACTMENT OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT AND ITS RECENT DEVELOPMENT
A. F. PnGwoL*
The ninth amendment declares:
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.1
This amendment, which had remained essentially unnoticed
through the turbulent conflicts generated by the rest of the
Bill of Rights, has been suddenly catapulted into prominence
through efforts to limit governmental intrusion into man's
daily personal habits and pursuits.
Prior to 1965, the unimportance of the ninth amendment
in the scheme of constitutional history and its irrelevance to
individual liberties secured by the Bill of Rights could hardly
be disputed. The activist role of the federal courts in the
1950's made the application of many of the first eight con-
stitutional amendments common knowledge. The state's rights
counterattack resuscitated the dormant tenth amendment. But
many of us, if candid, would have to admit total ignorance
of the content and meaning, if not the existence of the ninth
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I U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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amendment. Except for an occasional passing historical or
judicial reference, acknowledgment, or mournful lament at
its desuetude, the ninth amendment remained essentially ig-
nored for 175 years by historians, legal scholars, and judges.
By general agreement of those few who could claim to have
knowledge of the amendment, it was simply a legalistic rule
of construction appended to the first eight amendments, more
accurately characterized as a dead letter, devoid of substan-
tive meaning. 2 The dramatic rebirth of the ninth amendment
in 1965 was due solely to the concurring opinion of Justice
Goldberg in the landmark decision by the United States Su-
preme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut.8 In determining that
the Connecticut anti-birth control statute was unconstitutional
because it violated the ambit of the ninth amendment, Jus-
tice Goldberg unleashed a spectacular concentration of schol-
arly introspection and prompted an unprecedented revalua-
tion of the constitutional protection of personal freedoms.
Had the Bill of Rights not been demanded by a majority
of the delegates to the ratification conventions, there would
have been no need for the ninth amendment. Obviously, with-
out the "enumeration" of the first eight amendments, the
ninth amendment would have never been considered. Its in-
clusion in the Bill of Rights and its specific application to
the entire Constitution raise vital questions which could be
determinative of the future role of the amendment. The most
vital issue in the current development and growth of the
ninth amendment is the need to interpret and define the key
word "others" as used in the amendment. What were the un-
enumerated rights which the people, although not specifically
designating them in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Con-
stitution, did not relinquish to the new central government?
If those rights could somewhow be catalogued, are they the
only ones protected by the ninth amendment, or should post-
2 E. DUzMAULD, THE BImL OF RIGHTS AD WHAT IT MEANs To-
DAY 63-64 (1955).
8 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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1791 rights, like the freedom to obtain and use birth control
information and supplies, also be included?
After its adoption, the ninth amendment was all but for-
gotten. Although no specific individual right found protection
under the amendment prior to the Griswold decision, there
were a few judicial decisions which considered it, and an oc-
casional writer who sought its meaning and urged its rele-
vance. The minor attention paid to the ninth amendment dur-
ing its 175 year period of gestation deserves close scrutiny
because it became very significant when present day jurists
sought solutions to modern legal problems. The post-Griswold
expansion of the ninth amendment, and logical extensions
which can be expected in the future, seem to support the par-
allel contentions that the ninth amendment will continue to
mature as a touchstone for individual freedom and will soon
earn a place of importance alongside the fourteenth amend-
ment. In this study, we shall examine the formulation of the
ninth amendment, its judicial interpretation, the concept of
unenumerated rights, and the recent flurry of judicial activity
involving the ninth amendment.
THE RATIFICATION CoNvENTIONs, THE 1789
CoNGREss AND THE NINTH AmENDmmT
Apparently, the Constitutional Convention delegates gave
little thought to the inclusion of a bill of rights. The framers
were concerned principally with strengthening the national
government; and perhaps the common understanding that the
central government was one of enumerated powers only, plus
the fact that the Articles of Confederation contained no bill
of rights, convinced the delegates that such a task could be
safely avoided.
Delegates to many of the state ratification conventions
disagreed as to the need for a bill of rights. Antifederalists
based their attack upon the Constitution on its absence. They
were joined by pro-ratification elements which were gen-
uinely concerned that the federal government, under the "nec-
essary and proper" clause, the power of taxation and other
1972]
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newly granted powers, could encroach upon the liberties previ-
ously guaranteed by the states. As a result, several states pror
posed numerous amendments to the Constitution, some aimed
at crippling the power of the new government, but most either
specifying individual rights or prohibiting government action.
Massachusetts recommended 9 amendments for consideration
by the first Congress; New York suggested 32; Pennsylvania,
15, from the convention's minority report; Maryland, 28, in-
cluding the convention's minority report; Virginia, 40; North
Carolina, 46 (Virginia's and North Carolina's recommendations
were divided into a Declaration of Rights and proposed amend-
ments); New Hampshire, 12; and South Carolina, 4.4 Although
almost all of the suggested amendments were rejected by
Congress, they constitute an invaluable source for discovery
of those "other" rights which may have been referred to in
the ninth amendment.
The number and scope of the proposals were ludicrous
and clearly designed by the Antifederalists to impede or de-
feat ratification. They coupled the proposals with a call for
a second constitutional convention to consider all amendments,
a plan which ultimately would make ratification impossible.
The clamor for a bill of rights became a matter of great con-
cern to the Federalists, for the very existence of the infant
nation was at stake. They vigorously challenged the need for
a bill of rights, both in the Federalist papers and in the state
ratification conventions. These Federalist arguments are sin-
gularly important because they resulted in the addition of
the ninth amendment.
Hamilton, in Federalist papers 83 and 84, disputed the
contention of the anti-constitutionalists (as expounded prin-
cipally by Patrick Henry and George Mason) that the failure
to append a bill of rights implied a negation of such rights.
4 2 DEBATES passim (J. Elliott ed. 1937). When Rhode Island
ratified the Constitution in 1790 it proposed 21 amendments,
but they were not considered because they were presented
after the Bill of Rights had already been adopted.
[Vol. 8, No. I
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After pointing out that the citizens of several states, includ-
ing New York, were no less secure in their individual liberty
because their state had no bill of rights, and that the Con-
stitution as adopted contained many specific protections, he
elucidated the technical reasons for his viewpoint. Hamilton
pointed out that under the British system, because that gov-
ernment is based upon the rights of the king, a bill of rights
is essential to limit the monarchial domain. But the Ameri-
can system, he argued, is based on the rights of the people,
and the government has only such powers as are granted by
the people. "The people surrender nothing, and as they re-
tain every thing, they have no need of particular reserva-
tions."5 Not only is a bill of rights unnecessary, Hamilton con-
tinued, but any attempt to specify the rights reserved to the
people would be potentially dangerous. Referring indirectly
to the common law maxim expressio unius exclusio est alterius
(which in this context means that by specifying particular
rights, all other rights would be excluded by implication),
he said of a bill of rights:
They would contain various exceptions to powers
which are not granted, and on this very account,
would afford a colourable pretext to claim more than
were granted. For why declare that things shall not
be done which there is no power to do?6
Madison also feared that it would be insurmountably dif-
ficult to draft specific reservations of rights which could not
later be subverted by narrow constructions. For example, he
believed strongly in a broadly defined right of conscience,
and was concerned about the inability to express fully the con-
cept in writing.7 He wrote to Jefferson in October, 1788, stating
his view that, by enumerating certain rights, "some of the
1 Tim FEDERALIST No. 84, at 578 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
I Id. at 579.
7 Kelly, Clio and the Court, An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup.
CT. REv. 119, 152-53.
19721
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most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite
latitude."8
Madison's opposition to a bill of rights began to weaken
when he saw the wide support the Antifederalists had en-
gendered for a bill of rights. Jefferson had also announced
his support. In order not to jeopardize ratification in Vir-
ginia, Madison promised the convention that Congress would
give first priority to amendments embodying a bill of rights
and that he would personally use his influence and efforts
to that end. Similar assurances were given to other conven-
tions in which ratification was questionable. Based partly on
these representations, the necessary number of states ratified
the Constitution, attaching their proposed amendments mere-
ly as recommendations.
When Congress first met in April, 1789, it faced the monu-
mental task of establishing the new government. The higher
priorities of organizing the executive and judicial depart-
ments forced postponement of consideration of the amend-
ments proposed by the states. Because he had promised prompt
action on amendments, Madison feared that unless the House
took up the subject, the states would become suspicious of
national power and the precarious Union might collapse.9 Dur-
ing the early weeks of the session, Madison had carefully
studied and worked over the numerous proposed amendments,
discarding both the obvious duplications and those that were
anathemas to supporters of a strong central government. Re-
lying heavily on the Virginia proposals, he prepared suggest-
ed amendments for congressional action. After delays by the
House, he finally persuaded the members that, at the very
least, proposed amendments should be introduced. On July
8, 1789, Madison presented to the House his suggestions for
8 U.S. CONSTIT=OuNA SESQUICENTENNIAL COMMISSION, HIS-
TORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION UNDE THE CONSTITU-
TION 293 (1941).
9 B. MITCHELL & L. MITcHEL, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CONSTITu-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 192 (1964).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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incorporating amendments into the body of the Constitution.1"
In spite of objections, 1 Madison's proposals were referred
to a Committee of the Whole House,'12 and later on July 21,
to a select committee consisting of one representative from
each state.18
Madison's fourth suggested amendment contained ten
sections which he desired to be inserted between clauses 3
(prohibiting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws) and
4 (prohibiting direct taxation) of article I, section 9, of the
Constitution. The last of the ten sections provided:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution,
made in favor of particular rights, shall not be so
construed as to diminish the just importance of other
rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the
powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as
actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted mere-
ly for greater caution. 4
After introducing all of his proposals, Madison defended the
adoption of a bill of rights and countered the Federalist op-
position. After reminding the representatives of their obliga-
tion to the many dissidents in the states to whom a bill of
rights was essential, he countered the argument against enu-
meration:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that,
by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of
power, it would disparage those rights which were
not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the
hands of the General Government, and were conse-
10 1 ANNALS OF THE CONGaSS OF THE UNITED STATES 433 (J.
Gales, Sr. ed. 1851).1 Id. at 442.
12 Id. at 450.
13 Id. at 664.
14 Id. at 435. The wording of Madison's proposal 4 (10) is quite
similar to the Virginia ratification convention amendment
17. 3 DEBATES 661 (J. Elliot ed. 1937). See also E. DumBAuLD,
supra note 2, at 188-89, 198.
1972]
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quently insecure. This is one of the most plausible
arguments I have ever heard urged against the ad-
mission of a bill of rights into this system, but, I con-
ceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempt-
ed it, so gentlemen may see by turning to the last
clause of the fourth resolution.15
The select committee reported back to the House one week
later. The committee had changed Madison's original language
in proposition 4(10) to the exact wording of what became
the ninth amendment, and the committee's recommended
language was ultimately accepted by the House without de-
bate.16 Having decided to append the proposed amendments
instead of incorporating them into the body of the Constitu-
tion, on August 24, 1789, the House adopted the articles of
amendment, designating Madison's original proposition 4(10)
as article 15 of seventeen articles. 17
On September 2, the Senate began considering the House
proposals. Only passing reference to article 15 is made in the
Senate Journal. The reporter noted that, on September 7,
while considering article 15, the Senate rejected another pro-
posed amendment. After a brief conference between chambers,
on September 25, 1789, both houses concurred on twelve
15 1 ANNALs, supra note 10, at 439.
16 1 ANNALs, supra note 10, at 767. Madison's proposal 4(10)
had by then been designated as the eighth proposition.
17 1 ANNALs, supra note 10, at 779. See B. PATTERSON, TiE FOR-
GOTTEN NiNTH AMENDmNT 14-15 (1955). Patterson deems
this change of great significance. He argues that, having
decided to append the proposals to the Constitution, the
House should have reinserted the words "here or elsewhere"
from the original draft since those words were unnecessary
if the proposal had been incorporated into the body of the
Constitution. He concludes that this omission was partly
the cause for a limited application of the ninth amendment.
Because the ninth amendment applies by its express lan-
guage to the entire Constitution, not just to the amend-
ments, the "here or elsewhere" phrase seems redundant. If
it had been as important as Patterson suggests, surely Madi-
son, an opponent of appending the amendments, would have
insisted on inclusion of the phrase.
[Vol. 8, No. 1
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amendments to be presented to the states for ratification.18
Madison's proposition 4(10) had become article 11 of the pro-
posed amendments. The Senate did not alter the wording
from the House proposal. When the first two articles failed
to obtain state approval, article 11 became the ninth amend-
ment.19
PrE-GRISwoLD NARRATIE AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE NnTH AmEDwENT
The first known commentary on the ninth amendment
was a curious statement by Edmund Randolph who described
it as "an opiate... which is merely plausible."20 Other early
interpretations seemed to recognize its significance. In 1833,
in Bayard's handbook on the Constitution, the ninth and tenth
amendments are lumped together and rather vaguely describ-
ed as showing,
. . . the jealousy with which the people regarded the
new government, and the care with which the people
guarded against any unauthorized exercise of its pow-
er .... These are important articles, and express the
sense of the people, on points of highest consequence.21
Commentaries on th.e Constitution of the United States, writ-
ten in 1833 by Joseph Story, the earliest scholarly treatise on
the Constitution, contains only a terse explanation of the
amendment, undoubtedly based on conclusions drawn from
18 1 AxNALS, supra note 10, at 76.
10 The two proposed amendments (numbers 1 and 2) which
were not ratified by the states provided for a specific ratio
of representation in the House of Representatives to popu-
lation, and prohibited Congress from making a change in
the salary of its members which would be effective before
the next election of Representatives.
20 Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA.
L. REV. 627, 633 (1956).
21 J. BAYARD, A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITiON OF THE
UNIrED STATES 140 (1833).
1972"1
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Madison's argument in Congress in support of enumeration.
Story states:
This clause was manifestly introduced to prevent any
perverse or ingenious misapplication of the well-
known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases
implies a negation in all others; and, e converso, that
a negation in particular cases implies an affirmation
in all others. The maxim, rightly understood, is per-
fectly sound and safe; but it has often been strangely
forced from its natural meaning into the support of
the most dangerous political heresies. The amendment
was undoubtedly suggested by the reasoning of the
Federalist on the subject of a general bill of rights. 22
Story's explanation established the ninth amendment as a
rule of construction to aid in the interpretation of other parts
of the Constitution, primarily the first eight amendments.
The clear implication is that the amendment has no substan-
tive import and cannot, by itself, recognize any individual
rights. Another great constitutional law authority, Thomas M.
Cooley, ignored the amendment altogether.23
Until 1936, when the first interpretive essay was publish-
ed dealing exclusively with the ninth amendment, no textual
treatment of the amendment appeared. Essentially unaided
by judicial decision, Knowlton Kelsey, an attorney, publish-
ed a monograph that year entitled "The Ninth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution." Basing his opinion on the con-
cept approved by the Supreme Court that each provision in
the Constitution has special meaning and none can be super-
fluous, he took the novel position that the ninth amendment
must mean more than Story had signified. He asserted that
the framers must have meant it also to be a repository of
other existing rights which could be protected against gov-
ernmental encroachment. Without any real historical basis,
22 2 J. STORY, CoMMENTvmmES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNTED STATES 651 (5th ed. 1905).
2 1 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LMITATIONS 66 (8th ed. 1927).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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Kelsey concluded somewhat prophetically that the ninth
amendment,
... must be a positive declaration of existing, though
unnamed rights, which may be vindicated under the
authority of the Amendment whenever and if ever
any governmental authority shall aspire to ungranted
power in contravention of "unenumerated rights. ' 24
This radical suggestion that the ninth amendment had sub-
stantive content, in addition to its role as a rule of construc-
tion applicable to the first eight amendments, must certainly
have surprised those jurists and constitutional scholars who
may have read the article.
An examination of the reported judicial decisions which,
by 1936, had even mentioned the ninth amendment, discloses
as little recognition of the amendment's significance as sug-
gested by the commentaries. 25 The first important legal dis-
putes which sought the meaning of the amendment were the
TVA cases in 1936 and 1939.20 The opponents of the Tennessee
Valley Authority claimed that, by engaging in the electric
power business, the Authority had prevented private individu-
als from using their property and earning a living. They urged
that this constituted a violation of a fundamental right pro-
tected by the ninth amendment. The Supreme Court rejected
this argument, finding that the federal government, under
article IV, section 3, of the Constitution, which gives Con-
gress the power to make regulations concerning the property
of the United States, had specific authority for its activities.
The Court found no violation of the ninth amendment, noting
that the amendment did not withdraw rights expressly grant-
ed to the central government.
24 Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,
11 IND. L.J. 309, 323 (1936).
25 For the citation of all reported decisions involving the ninth
amendment, see Appendix A.
21 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
1972]
11
Ringold: The History of the Enactment of the Ninth Amendment and Its Recen
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1972
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
It seems appropriate to characterize the period between
the TVA cases and Griswold, even though more than 140 years
subsequent to the adoption of the amendment, as the early
developmental stage of the ninth amendment. It was during
this time that we learned what the amendment did not mean,
and it was a period of speculative writing by scholars who
wondered if they had missed something all those years.
Between the TVA cases and the 1965 Griswold pronounce-
ment, various state and federal courts passed upon the appli-
cability of the ninth amendment. In the sixteen reported de-
cisions, not one tribunal held the amendment to protect the
right being asserted. In the Hatch Act case,27 the plaintiff as-
serted that citizens have a fundamental right to engage in
political activity and campaigns, free of governmental inter-
ference. The Court acknowledged the existence of political
rights and implied that this specifically claimed right, in the
absence of a congressional grant of power to the executive
branch of the federal government, would be protected under
the ninth amendment. Justice Reed concluded:
Therefore, when objection is made that the exercise
of a federal power infringes upon rights reserved by
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the inquiry must
be directed toward the granted power under which
the action of the Union was taken. If granted power
is found, necessarily the objection of invasion of those
rights, reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
must fail. Again this Court must balance the extent
of the guarantees of freedom against a congressional
enactment to protect a democratic society against the
supposed evil of political partisanship by classified
employees of government.28
This distinction between constitutional rights in the people
and congressional power in the government has been severe-
ly criticized both as an unwarranted emasculation of the ninth
27 United Pub. Workers of America (CIO) v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947).
28 Id. at 96.
[Vol. 8, No. 1
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amendment and as an unfounded basis for the dominance of
the central government.'
In another case, the seizure of the steel mills by presi-
dential order was held unconstitutional in 1952 by a federal
district judge as beyond the scope of executive authority. The
court, in a footnote, indicated that the ninth amendment limit-
ed the power of the executive and other branches of the fed-
eral government.30 More recently, when the Colorado Supreme
Court sustained the constitutionality of that state's fair hous-
ig law, it rejected a contention that citizens have a funda-
mental right, protected by the ninth amendment, to discrimi-
nate against Negroes. Although dictum, the court observed
that, based on the ninth amendment, every man has an un-
enumerated inalienable right to acquire a home for himself
and his family, uninhibited by discrimination on account of
race, creed or color.3 ' The seeds of Griswold were planted.
These early decisions were also important because they
created a new interest and a new controversy. The compara-
tively large number of cases in which a ninth amendment
right was asserted prompted research by historians and legal
scholars. They speculated at its dormancy, its meaning (if any),
its application. In 1955, a useful book was written promoting
the long neglected role of the amendment. In language previ-
ously reserved for some of the first eight amendments, the
author entreats the judiciary to revitalize the ninth amend-
ment:
We hope that some day our courts, when called upon
29 Call, Federalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 DicK. L.
REv. 121, 130 (1960); Abrams, What Are the Rights Guaran-
teed by the Ninth Amendment?, 53 A.B.A.J. 1033, 1035
(1967); Kelley, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth
Amendment, 33 U. Cm. L. REV. 814, 826 (1966).
80 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569
(D.D.C. 1952), affd 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the Supreme Court
affirmed without mention of the ninth amendment).
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to do so, in the vindication of one of the unenumerated
rights, will find or rediscover the Ninth Amendment
with the full force of its meaning.
It is now covered with the "dust of antique time",
but it is hoped that the dust may be swept away and
the clouds removed, and that the "mountainous er-
ror" has not been piled so high that "truth cannot
o'er peer it."
We will ultimately find that this amendment is a
succinct expression of the inherent dignity and liberty
of the individual and a recognition of the soul of
mankind, a belief in his spiritual nature, and an hum-
ble acknowledgment of the infinity of our Creator
and our nature.3
2
Samplings of other pre-Griswold writers demonstrate a
wide divergence of views, both as to the meaning and scope
of the amendment. But one question nagged all of the writers.
Why had the issue remained unexplored for so many years?
Those who followed Story's interpretation found it quite na-
tural that a non-essential amendment had received scant at-
tention. As late as 1957, one writer considered it a "dead let-
ter":
The Ninth Amendment was not intended to add any-
thing to the meaning of the remaining articles in the
Constitution. It was simply a technical proviso insert-
ed to forestall the possibility of misinterpretation of
the rest of the document .... It was adopted in or-
der to eliminate the grant of powers by implication
as the result of any language in the Constitution
which might contain a "negative pregnant." . . . It
is destitute of substantive effect.
33
If the ninth amendment was designed merely as a precaution,
then such thorny constitutional problems as (1) its applica-
bility to the states through the fourteenth amendment, (2)
the "other" unenumerated rights encompassed by the amend-
22 B. PATTFRSON, supra note 17, at 26.
33 E. DtmnAuLD, supra note 2, at 63-64.
[Vol. 8, No. 1
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ment, and (3) whether the "other" rights are limited to those
existing only at the time of ratification or include newly dis-
covered rights, do not arise. But one analyst, an authority on
civil law, who believes that the ninth amendment is a rule
of construction for the first eight amendments and not a stor-
age compartment for individual rights, also finds the amend-
ment has a special task far more extensive than its supposed
domain.
It is the mission of the Ninth Amendment not only
to prevent the weakening of the Second Constitution
[the Second Constitution refers to the Bill of Rights],
but to provide for the development of such texts to
control historically new situations. It is not therefore
a text consecrating natural rights without content,
natural law with a variable content;34 but it is a text
of juridical method. It is a text concerning the judi-
ciary power.... The great role of the Ninth Amend-
ment thus becomes clearer. It requires the consistent
judicial development of the first eight amendments
to control novel situations which are not immediately
subject to the Second Constitution. "
If the amendment has this particular function, why has it
gone so long unrecognized? Some possible answers may help
explain the reason that, pre-Griswold, the ninth amendment
was not a vital force. These same answers should also define
the status of the amendment prior to that decision.
Constitutional interpretation during the Nineteenth cen-
tury was greatly influenced by the writings of the pre-eminent
34 This was essentially the view of Roscoe Pound as stated
in his introduction to Patterson's book. Pound argued that
"[t]he Ninth Amendment is a solemn declaration that na-
tural rights are not a fixed category of reasonable human
expectations in civilized society laid down once for all in
the several sections of the Constitution." Pound, forward to
B. PATTEmSON, supra note 17, at iv.
35 Franklin, The Relation of the Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth
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scholars, Story and Cooley. Because Story gave scant recogni-
tion to the ninth amendment, and then only as a rule of con-
struction, it was a natural outcome that the amendment re-
ceived similar inattention from the legal community, and
that early constitutional issues involved only the first eight
amendments. In addition, when the Bill of Rights was held
to be inapplicable to the states in 1833,36 the potential develop-
ment of a concept of universal protection of unenumerated
rights became limited to situations involving encroachment
by the central government, where adequate protections seem-
ed to be in force. Perhaps most important, however, was the
comparatively late development of post-ratification fundamen-
tal rights. In spite of the tumult raised in the revolutionary
period, meaningful expansion of individual rights did not oc-
cur until after the Civil War. Since that time, the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments have been principally utilized to protect those
rights. The ninth amendment seemingly became obsolete be-
fore its development began. Its value, if it had any, as a re-
pository of unenumerated rights, was usurped by other con-
stitutional provisions.
A sneak preview to Griswold came in 1962 in the form of
an article by Norman Redlich, a law professor. While Griswold
was pending in the lower federal courts, almost a certainty
to reach the Supreme Court, the author wondered whether
the rights of citizens would ultimately be limited to those
specified in the first eight amendments or elsewhere in the
Constitution. As the plaintiff was asserting a fundamental
right of privacy against state infringement, not specifically
protected by the Constitution, would this not be a good case
to reevaluate the role of the ninth amendment? He invited
the Court to hold that the ninth amendment reserved to a
married couple the fundamental right to maintain the in-
timacy of the marital relationship, without government regu-
36 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 464 (1833).
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lation or interference.37 He vigorously advocated that the
ninth amendment stands for the proposition that all funda-
mental rights were not stated in the Constitution and first
eight amendments, and that through the fourteenth amend-
ment the ninth amendment should be extended to the states.
No one, other than perhaps Professor Redlich, foresaw the
impact of Griswold on the ninth amendment.
GRiswOLD An nm Num AmEmxmIQ NT
The Griswold case was the second challenge in the Su-
preme Court to the Connecticut anti-birth control legislation.
The first case38 had not resulted in a decision on the substan-
tive issues due to technical difficulties. In Griswold, perhaps
spurred by Professor Redlich's argument, the opponents of
the statute urged that state interference with the practice of
birth control by a married couple was an infringement of
their right of privacy, a fundamental right protected by the
first, ninth and fourteenth amendments. The Court, divided
seven to two, held the statutes unconstitutional primarily
because they violated the first amendment freedoms of speech
and association. In the terminology of Justice Douglas, who
wrote the opinion of the Court, the right of privacy is within
the "periphery" and "penumbra" of the guarantees of these
first amendment protections, applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment.39 While Douglas' opinion was it-
self a radical departure from customary constitutional termi-
nology, it is Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion that is of
11 Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained By The
People"?, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787, 796 (1962).
38 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
89 In Justice Douglas' terminology, "... specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.... Various guarantees create zones of privacy.
... We have had many controversies over these penumbral
rights of 'privacy and repose'. . . . These cases bear wit-
ness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition
here is a legitimate one." 381 U.S. at 484-85.
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dramatic importance. Not content to rely on the protection
offered the right of privacy by the first and fourteenth amend-
ments, Goldberg felt that the significance of the ninth amend-
ment was of such magnitude as to justify separate treatment.
He began discussion of the ninth amendment by saying, "I
add these words to emphasize the relevance of that Amend-
ment to the Court's holding.40
After briefly tracing the history of the enactment of the
ninth amendment, Justice Goldberg first concluded that it was
. . . clear that the Framers did not intend that the
first eight amendments be construed to exhaust the
basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution
guaranteed to the people.41
After noting that the amendment had received meager rec-
ognition by the Supreme Court, he defended his determina-
tion to rely upon it as the basis for his concurring opinion:
The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution may be
regarded by some as a recent discovery and may be
forgotten by others, but since 1791 it has been a basic
part of the Constitution which we are sworn to up-
hold. To hold that a right so basic and fundamental
and so deep-rooted in our society as the right of pri-
vacy in marriage may be infringed because that right
is not guaranteed in so many words by the first eight
amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth
Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever. More-
over, a judicial construction that this fundamental
right is not protected by the Constitution because it
is not mentioned in explicit terms by one of the first
eight amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution
would violate the [specific language of the] Ninth
Amendment ... 42
Eschewing any notion that he was attempting either to
enlarge the power of the Court or to make the ninth amend-
40 Id. at 487.
41 Id. at 490.
42 Id. at 491.
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ment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment, Justice Goldberg guardedly enunciated his concept of
the role of the ninth amendment:
Nor do I mean to state that the Ninth Amendment
constitutes an independent source of rights protected
from infringement by either the States or the Fed-
eral Government. Rather, the Ninth Amendment
shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that fun-
damental rights exist that are not expressly en-
umerated in the first eight amendments and an in-
tent that the list of rights included there not be
deemed exhaustive.43
Because he determined that the unenumerated right of marital
privacy was fundamental to personal liberty, he concluded
that the ninth amendment was relevant to show that such
right could be protected against state infringement by the
fourteenth amendment. In sum, Goldberg ostensibly retained
the "rule of construction" interpretation of the ninth amend-
ment, but at the same time indicated that the amendment
could be a powerful force to limit state infringement of fun-
damental personal rights.
Goldberg's disclaimer that the ninth amendment consti-
tutes an "independent source of rights" should not be con-
sidered a limitation on the scope of the now revitalized amend-
ment. For historically none of the amendments, nor the Con-
stitution itself, is the source of the natural rights of man.
These are rights, however ultimately defined, which the poli-
tical state must respect because every man by his very na-
ture possesses them. They are rights which may neither be
relinquished to, nor bestowed by, a government. Thus one
may acept Goldberg's statement, yet consistently maintain
that the ninth amendment is a repository and descriptive of
man's fundamental liberties to the same degree as the first
eight amendments.
Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold has been char-
48 Id. at 492.
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acterized as a "tour de force," without adding substance to
the concept of fundamental rights;44 and as "a curious mix-
ture of law-office (i.e. advocative, not impartial) history and
vaulting legal logic. '4 5 Justice Black, in a stinging dissent,
criticized Justice Goldberg, accusing him of playing with
words. For Black, the ninth amendment and the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment means the same thing,
and Goldberg's utilization of the ninth amendment was un-
justified and dangerous. Black argued that the Court was
peculiarly ill-suited to determine the "collective conscience of
our people" and would thus substitute its own notion of "fun-
damental principles of liberty and justice" in reviewing the
legislative enactments of the federal and state governments.
Unable to find a scintilla of constitutional authority bestow-
44 Kauper, Penumbras and Peripheries, 64 MICH. L. REv. 235,
254 (1965). Professor Kauper, a respected authority on
constitutional law, felt that the same decision could have
been made without use of the ninth amendment.
45 Kelly, supra note 7, at 150. Professor Kelly described the
Griswold decision as an "astonishing resuscitation of the
Ninth Amendment." Kelly, supra note 7, at 149. He believes
that Goldberg misread Madison's intentions and that his
statements in the opinion are historically inaccurate. Pro-
fessor Kelly asserts that Goldberg's "notion of pulling new
natural rights from the air to allow for an indefinite ex-
pansion can hardly be considered to be within the original
spirit of the amendment, even if we assume that Madison
was attempting a vague guarantee of rights that he did
not care to enumerate." Kelly, supra note 7, at 155. Kelly
perhaps overlooks the fact that, although the boundaries
of natural law were in Madison's time the fairly definite
"rights of Englishmen" parameter, those rights were of
necessity spelled out because of the supremacy of Parlia-
ment. With the concept of limited delegated powers pre-
vailing under the American constitutional system, there
was no need to delineate each natural right of man. Pro-
fessor Kelly's interpretation of the ninth amendment (which
could hardly be different from his view on the first eight
amendments) must logically lead to the discredited con-
cept of a static Constitution.
[Vol. 8, No. 1
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ing such power on the Court, Black warns that to permit such
a subjective resolution of constitutional issues would trans-
form the Court into a veto wielding super authority.46
Justice Stewart also wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
He characterized Goldberg's application of the ninth amend-
ment as "turning somersaults with history,"4 7 and concluded
that the amendment merely states a platitude. In Justice
Stewart's view, the amendment could not, under any circum-
stances, form the basis for declaring a state law unconsti-
tutional.
More approving commentaries hailed Goldberg's "redis-
covery" of ninth amendment protections as the first major
judicial treatment of the amendment which may
... heighten the prospects for judicial support, case
by case, for a broader range of "privacy" situations
and of other hard-to-classify interests which, despite
their vagueness, should be "retained by the people"
in a democratic public order strongly committed to
preserving individuality.48
At least one scholar disagrees with Justice Black's analysis,
concluding that Goldberg's position is generally supported by
the history of the enactment of the ninth amendment.49 He
finds Black's concern about the absence of a specific provi-
sion dealing with privacy to be unconvincing.
Before discussing the judicial aftermath of Griswold and
the insights which these cases may give to the future role of
the ninth amendment in the scheme of individual rights, it
is necessary to focus upon two important problems highlight-
-1 Justice Black's dissent is important because he presents a
totally different concept of the ninth amendment, both as
to its history and its meaning.
47 381 U.S. at 527.
48 Dixon, Jr., The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter
For an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 McH. L. REv. 197,
207 (1965).
9 Abrams, supra note 29, at 1035.
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ed by the Goldberg and Black opinions. It is clear that Black
assigns no real significance to the amendment, while in con-
trast Goldberg envisions it as a judicial rule of construction
at the very least, and perhaps even as a catch basin for use
along with the fourteenth amendment. Initially then, we must
ascertain the several possible roles which the ninth amend-
ment can presently perform, and then select those most logi-
cally and historically fitting. Without such guidelines, any
attempt at speculative inquiry concerning the amendment's
application would be meaningless. The second issue, although
not a new one in the constitutional domain, arises from Gold-
berg's belief that the ninth amendment protects rights which
are basic and fundamental to our society. How, as Black de-
manded, can we determine which rights, zealously asserted
from time to time, meet the high standards of unenumerated
guarantees of the ninth amendment that exist along with
those specified in the first eight amendments? Are the Gold-
berg tests so subjective as to make the determination solely
one based on the individual personal prejudices of the mem-
bers of the Supreme Court? If Black's incisive criticism is
to be meaningfully rejoined, what standards can and should
be used by the Court when it reflects upon the constitutional
quality of an asserted right?
As pointed out in the treatment of the pre-Griswold era,
the ninth amendment was then considered principally as a
rule of construction, ° a statement of intent showing that the
framers knew that rights other than those specified in the
first eight amendments were reserved to the people. Professor
Franklin suggests that the amendment had the additional
function of directing the judiciary to expand the literal lan-
guage of the first eight amendments to cover new situations. 1
This additional role assigned to the ninth amendment has a
proper historical basis because it is clear Madison intended
that all of the natural rights of the people should be protect-
Wo See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
51 See notes 42 and 43 supra and accompanying text.
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ed by the Bill of Rights. Other pre-Griswold tasks proposed
for the ninth amendment include both that of a counter-
balance to the "necessary and proper" clause of article 1, sec-
tion 8, which gives Congress broad lawmaking authority,52
as well as a counterpart for the individual to the general wel-
fare clause in the Preamble, which protects public rights.53
Finally, Dean Roscoe Pound postulated that the ninth amend-
ment was meant to insure the growth and development of
natural law:
The Ninth Amendment is a pronouncement of a
solemn warning to the agencies of government that
there are reasonable expectations of individual men
living in civilized society which the people retain
and for which recognition and security may be de-
manded.54
What, if anything, has Griswold added to the part to be
played by the ninth amendment? Despite Goldberg's cautious
admonition, the ninth amendment has subsequently had, and
potentially will have, a greatly expanded role in the protec-
tion of individual rights.
Starting with the accepted constitutional principles that
(1) the first eight amendments protect individual citizens
against infringement of certain specific (and in the case of
the fifth amendment, rather vague) fundamental natural
rights5 s5 and (2) such protection has, through the fourteenth
amendment, been extended in most respects to state action,
Justice Goldberg concludes that the ninth amendment "is
surely relevant in showing the existence of other fundamental
personal rights, now protected from state, as well as federal
52 Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CALiF. L. REV. 787, 793
(1959); Kelly, supra note 7, at 152.
5 B. PATT oN, supra note 17, at 57.
54 Pound, Forward to B. PATTEsoN, supra note 17, at vi.
15 The term "natural rights," in the context of American juris-
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infringement." 56 This is the most revolutionary passage from
his opinion, for it advances a new dual sphere of influence
for the amendment. Goldberg goes beyond the "rule of con-
struction" concept (that the amendment merely prevents judi-
cial disparagement of those rights not enumerated) by assert-
ing that the ninth amendment affirmatively demonstrates the
existence of individual rights of equal importance to those
enumerated in the first eight amendments. In the context of
the interpretation of the Constitution as a dynamic, up to
date, frame of government, the ninth amendment must then
be considered as authority to support the existence of newly
discovered fundamental rights. It is more than a passive re-
ceptacle for pre-ratification rights. The ninth amendment now
encompasses in its scope modem day revelations of basic per-
sonal freedoms through the development of natural rights.
Furthermore, since fundamental individual rights are now
protected from state abridgement, the ninth amendment seems
destined to become applicable through the fourteenth to the
states. This may not occur directly, but the same practical
result should not come as a surprise. If the asserted privilege
is of such magnitude to be considered a fundamental right,
and thus included within ninth amendment protection, it is
inconceivable that the Supreme Court would deny such pro-
tection from state action.57 This enlargement of the role of
the ninth amendment would be a marked extension of the
purview of the Bill of Rights and would exceed even Madi-
son's expressed desires for a positive declaration of natural
rights.
The definitional problem with respect to "fundamental
us 381 U.S. at 493.
57 Patterson urged that the amendment was intended to and
should be applicable to the states, giving nine reasons to
support his viewpoint. B. PATTERSON, supra note 17, at 37.
For a contrary opinion, see E. DT.mMAULD, supra note 2, at
138. Dumbauld seems, however, to confuse the ninth and
tenth amendments.
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rights" is no less difficult than determining the role of the
ninth amendment. Because the Supreme Court has previously
dealt with this concept in formulating the rights encompass-
ed under the fifth and the fourteenth amendments, it has
not found it necessary to conceive new principles of consti-
tutional law. An individual right or freedom is fundamental
if it is: "... . a principle of liberty and justice which lies at
the base of all our civil and political institutions";58 ". . . im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty . . . of the very es-
sence of a scheme of ordered liberty... a fair and enlighten-
ed system of justice would be impossible without them";59
".... a principle of justice so rooted in the tradition and con-
science of our people"; 0 or "... lies at the foundation of a
free society."61
While these concepts of a fundamental right vary from
an absolutely essential standard to a "conscience of the peo-
ple" test, the principal notion is that, to be entitled to con-
stitutional protection, the asserted right must be at least a
substantial tenet of our particular republican f orm of
democracy, the violation of which would do serious injustice
under the American system.6 2 As Professor Redlich has sug-
58 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (in which the
Court invalidated Oregon's criminal syndicalism statute).
I' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (holding that
the fifth amendment proscription against double jeopardy
does not prohibit a state through the fourteenth amend-
ment from retrying a defendant under all circumstances).
60 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (which
dealt with the right of an accused to be present at all stages
of his trial).
61 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960).
62 A student has advanced the proposition that John Stuart
Mill's ON LIBERTY contains the most acceptable criteria for
determining rights protected under the ninth amendment.
Comment, Unenumerated Rights-Substantive Due Process,
the Ninth Amendment, and John Stuart Mill, 1971 Wis. L.
REV. 922. MRll's concept of balancing the interests of the
individual and that of the collective society seems archaic
in the context of our modern technological society.
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gested, the measuring standard under the ninth amendment
is the entire Constitution and amendments. "[R]ights reserv-
ed were to be of a nature comparable to the rights enu-
merated."' '
In Griswold, Goldberg felt no need to chart new ground
to refute Black's challenge that fundamental rights will ulti-
mately consist solely of current judge-made ideas. He seem-
ingly adopted an amalgam of the standards enunciated in
prior decisions:
In determining which rights are fundamental, judges
are not left at large to decide cases in light of their
personal and private notions. Rather, they must look
to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our
people" to determine whether a principle is "so rooted
[there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v.
Massachusetts. The inquiry is whether a right involv-
ed "is of such a character that it cannot be denied
without violating those 'fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions'. . . ." "Liberty" also
"gains content from the emanations of . . . specific
[constitutional] guarantees" and "from experience
with the requirements of a free society." Poe v. Ull-
Tnan.64
But Goldberg's use of language from Justice Douglas' dissent
in Poe v. Ullman adds an entirely new dimension to rather
well-formulated boundaries. The quantum of "experience"
Justice Goldberg would insist upon is problematical; the po-
tential enormous expansion of fundamental rights entitled to
protection under the ninth amendment is certain. Since Gris-
wold, the standard of such rights could conceivably be meas-
ured by comparatively ill-defined, hastily conceived notions
concerning the current popular demands, hardly the kinds
of natural rights rising to the hallowed aura of the Consti-
6 Redlich, supra note 37, at 810.
" 381 U.S. at 493-94.
Or 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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tution. Some of the judicial descendants of Griswold, ap-
parently invited by Goldberg's test of fundamental justice,
have given protection to an extensive array of newly discov-
ered personal rights.66 At the very least, Griswold has estab-
lished a capacity for development of "a broad protection
against unexperienced temporal powers . . . against newly
discovered governmental inroads of freedom. 6T
If Griswold has resulted in "the declaration of a new Bill
of Rights for the 20th Century" as one writer has observed,68
or more realistically has significantly expanded the concept
of dynamic natural rights, where does the historian or jurist
look for the source of those fundamental rights which the
ninth amendment guarantees? The difficult tests which have
been formulated to guide the courts in their search for the
meaning and scope of natural rights provoke this inquiry-
where should historians, judges, and prospective claimants
search for the traditions, roots, fundamental principles of
liberty and justice, and conscience of our people? Does his-
tory provide us with legitimate sources upon which to base
an assertion of unenumerated "fundamentalness" entitled to
ninth amendment protection? The problem of locating the
antecedent for a specific right, sought to be protected under
the ninth amendment, will be treated in the next section.
SOURCES OF UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
The ninth amendment, considered merely as a rule of con-
struction, means at the least that Madison did not intend to
spell out all of the rights and freedoms of the individual
citizen which were protected from government abridgment.
The implication of Griswold is that the specific right, for
66 These cases are discussed under the headings, THE NINTH
AnmDmENT SINcE 1965 and THE FUTURE OF TME NnTH
AmENDMENT.
0(7 C. ANTmU, RiGHTS OF OUR FATHERS 2 (1968).
08 Carroll, The Forgotten Amendment, NATION, Oct. 6, 1965
(No. 201), at 121-22.
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which protection is sought under the amendment, must be
traced to another recognized source.09 While there is no re-
quirement that the origin of the right pre-exist the adoption
of the Bill of Rights (privacy, for example, has been formaliz-
ed as a legal right only comparatively recently7 0), the more
venerable the source, the greater likelihood that a court will
deem the right fundamental. We shall briefly mention here
the more important early source materials, and conclude with
speculation on sources for "new" freedoms.
All of the rights enumerated in the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights can be traced to written antecedents, often
summarized in Blackstone's Commentaries as the rights of per-
sonal security, personal liberty and private property. These
were the natural rights of Englishmen for which the Revolu-
tionary War was purportedly waged. By that time, the colo-
nists had, in various documents, specified many freedoms and
privileges which their English counterparts either had not
considered a natural right or were unable to obtain from the
monarchy. They expressed these fundamental personal and
property rights in their earliest documents. The most im-
portant references in this period are the colonial charter
grants and the various agreements entered into by the colo-
nists to establish a frame of government. Only those docu-
ments which contain potential fundamental rights unenu-
merated in the Constitution or Bill of Rights will be discussed.
One of the earliest attempts at a comprehensive state-
ment of personal liberties was the Massachusetts Body of
Liberties, enacted in 1641.71 The first known formulation of
09 Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L.
REv. 219, 227 (1965).
70 M. ERNST & A. ScHWARTz, PRIVACY, THE RIGHT TO BE LET
ALoNE passim (1962).
71 All documents mentioned in this section can be found In
the principal reference work for the period, THE FEDERAL
Am STATE CONSTITUTioNS (F. Thorpe ed. 1909). The first
volume contains, at pages 38-86, the relevant Commissions,
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the asserted privilege to travel is contained in paragraph 17,
where the citizens are granted the right to leave the colony
with their families at any time. Free hunting and fishing
rights seemed important enough to be mentioned as a liberty.
Preceding the English Bill of Rights by eight years, the in-
habitants of West New Jersey in 1681 specified as fundamen-
tal law that the governing executive had no authority to sus-
pend the effectiveness of the laws of the colony.72 This basic
liberty, still not a part of our Constitution, was the first free-
dom specified in the English Bill of Rights:
That the pretended power of suspending laws, or the
execution of laws, by regal authority, without the con-
sent of parliament, is illegal.3
Other fundamental personal liberties which appear in the
English Bill of Rights, but which were omitted from specific
mention in the first eight amendments, include the prohibi-
tion of standing armies in peacetime, without parliament's
consent,74 and the right of free parliamentary elections.75 The
limitation against standing armies was enacted by the First
Continental Congress,78 and many colonies included both of
these rights when drafting their 1776 Constitutions.
The doctrine of natural rights got its biggest boost in 1776
when the Continental Congress severed ties with England.
Asserting that a people has the right ".... to assume among
the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to
which the laws of Nature and Nature's God entitle them... ,"
Congress began by summarizing certain unalienable rights,
Charters and Plans of Union for the period 1492-1754. The
remainder of the work contains all of the documents ante-
cedent to and including the Constitution of each state.
72 WEST NEW JERSEY PROVINCE AGIEmENrs § 2 (Nov. 25, 1681).
73 ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS § 1 (Dec. 16, 1689).
74 Id. at § 6.
75 Id. at § 8.
78 DECLARATIONS AND RESOLVES OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CoN-
GRESS, Resolution 9 (Oct. 14, 1774).
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among others. It then enunciated a new natural inherent
right; under certain circumstances, "... it is the right of the
people to alter or to abolish it [the government], and to in-
stitute new government. .... ,,7 Several states incorporated
this privilege in their first constitution, and several more pro-
posed it to the first Congress as an amendment. Madison even
included a limited right of revolution in his initial proposals.
In spite of almost complete acceptance, this freedom was
omitted from the Bill of Rights. But the deletion should be
inconsequential since no greater fundamentalness than as al-
ready stated in the Declaration of Independence could be re-
quired for an unenumerated natural right.
After being encouraged by the First Continental Congress
to establish their own constitutional frameworks, each of the
colonies enacted a written plan of government. Fresh from
abuses of natural law rights, the constitutional conventions
of Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,"8
North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Virginia enacted compre-
hensive Declarations or Bills of Rights, usually prefacing the
Constitution for added emphasis. The rights designated in
those documents constitute a catalogue of the natural rights
of the day, no longer merely the rights of Englishmen, but
the unalienable privileges an d immunities of embryonic
Americans.
The first, and by far the most influential, bill of rights
was adopted by the Virginia constitutional convention on June
12, 1776. Written by George Mason, it served as the archetype
for other state constitutions and Madison's draft for the
amendments to the United States Constitution. Mason listed
the fundamental rights of Virginians in sixteen concise para-
graphs. Those basic freedoms which remained unenumerated
in the first eight amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion included a limited right of revolution, no standing armies
77DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (July 4, 1776).
78 The New Hampshire Constitution of 1776 contained no bill
of rights. One was included in the Constitution of 1784.
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in peace time, free and frequent elections, and prohibition
against the power to suspend the laws without legislative
consent. It is ironic that Mason did not include a ninth amend-
ment type of provision in his Bill of Rights, since an amend-
ment later proposed by the Virginia delegation served as the
model for the ninth amendment.
Madison recognized the importance of state constitutions
as a compendium of natural rights. In the congressional de-
bate on the Bill of Rights, he observed:
It may be said, indeed it has been said, that a bill of
rights is not necessary, because the establishment of
this Government has not repealed those declarations
of rights which are added to the seueral State Con-
stitutions; that those rights of the people, which had
been established by the most solemn act, could not
be annihilated by a subsequent act of that people,
who meant, and declared at the head of the instru-
ment, that they ordained and established a new sys-
tem, for the express purpose of securing to themselves
and posterity the liberties they had gained by an
arduous conflict. ' 79 (Emphasis added).
In the ratification conventions, the lengthy debates on
the subject of a Bill of Rights generated numerous proposals
and demands for consideration by the first Congress. The Ar-
ticles of Confederation of 1781, which contained no enumera-
tion of individual rights, created no such furor. The fact that
the new central government was so much more powerful
hardly explains the rather sudden universal concern for speci-
fications. Most of the state constitutions with their awesome
declarations of rights, were enacted prior to the Articles of
Confederation. But spurred by the Declaration of Independ-
ence, the evolution of natural rights inexplicably blossomed
forth in the voluminous proposals for the Bill of Rights.80
7S 1 AxNAIs, supra note 10, at 438.
80 The total number of proposed amendments officially pre-
sented to Congress was 186. Eliminating duplications, there
were 80 substantive proposals.
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A definite prohibition against a standing army in peace
time seemed of utmost importance to the states. Six of the
seven states which submitted proposals included this freedom
from governmental domination. In Massachusetts, an attempt
to include this right was defeated.81 Earlier, Connecticut and
New Jersey had unsuccessfully attempted to include it as
an amendment to the Articles of Confederation.8 2 During the
ratification debates, Luther Martin, of Maryland and George
Mason objected to its omission from the Constitution.83 After
considerable discussion, a watered-down version offered by
Mason was rejected by the federal constitutional convention,
even though supported by Madison, 4 and did not even appear
in Madison's original proposals to the House of Representa-
tives.
There were several other guaranteed protections which
the state ratification conventions urged Congress to include
in the Bill of Rights, but which were not adopted. The states
sought assurances for their citizens against monopolies cre-
ated by the Federal government, against suspension of laws,
for free and frequent elections, and for the right to challenge
a jury. Madison sought to include a "right of conscience" to
what became the first amendment, and to make the Bill of
Rights applicable to each state as well as the federal govern-
ment. 5
These propositions, which were shunned by Congress, and
reasonable "emanations" from them, should legitimately be
the source of unenumerated natural rights. They meet the
Griswold tests of both the conscience of the people and roots
81 2 DEBATEs, supra note 4, at 97-98, 136-37.
82 1 DEBATES, 87-88 (J. Elliot ed. 1937).
8 Id. at 370-71, 496 (Luther Martin's letter to the Maryland
Legislature on January 27, 1788, and George Mason's objec-
tions to the Constitution).
84 5 DEBATES 544-45 (J. Elliott ed. 1937).
85 1 Ai. ALs, supra note 10, at 434-35 (Madison's proposals 4
and 5).
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of American tradition. That we might take those rights for
granted and that an attempt by the federal government to as-
sert power in these areas might be sucessfully thwarted un-
der another amendment, cannot be sufficient reasons to down-
grade their importance as potential ninth amendment rights.
The Douglas doctrine of "penumbras" and "emanations" could
logically provide an argument to expand the "no standing
army" prohibition to legislation and executive action concern-
ing the misty Vietnam "war." This doctrine could also cause
serious legal and political problems, based on the no "suspen-
sion of laws" limitation, in connection with domestic disorders.
Also, the use of the ninth amendment, instead of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, could "simplify judicial opinions,
facilitate logical analysis, and, in some cases, place less strain
on credulity."' 6 How refreshing it would be to find a judicial
opinion pointing directly to an unenumerated fundamental
right protected by the ninth amendment instead of reading
the semantics of a due process or equal protection opinion.
The Constitution is a dynamic charter which recognizes
the necessity for growth of personal rights and freedoms to
keep pace with the development of society and government.
Newly discovered natural rights, to protect the individual
against unreasonable expansion or application of governmen-
tal powers, seldom bring forth anguished cries any more from
the traditionalist who seeks a static interpretation of the Con-
stitution. There are at least two methods for recognition of
post-Bill of Rights fundamental human freedoms, exclusive
of the amendatory procedure provided for in the Constitu-
tion.87 The first is through the development of state constitu-
tions, both in their enactment and interpretation, and the
80 Comment, Ninth Amendment Vindication of Unenumerated
Fundamental Rights, 42 TEMP. L.Q. 46, 54 n. 53 (1968).
87 Of the 16 post-Bill of Rights amendments adopted, only the
reconstruction amendments and the two voting changes
(sex and age) enhance personal rights. Thus the amenda-
tory procedure has not been actively used to expand the
freedoms of the Bill of Rights.
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other is through multi-national documents, such as the United
Nations Charter.
Following the examples of the original states and the cen-
tral government, each new state adopted a constitution, and
generally a declaration of rights, upon admission to the Union.
Almost all of the state charter documents have undergone
substantial changes or complete revisions several times since
enactment. The expansion of state bills of rights, through
amendment and judicial construction, to the extent that a
particular "new" freedom is widely recognized, must be a
revelation of the "conscience of the people" regarding that
human right. Reliance upon its specific acceptance by numer-
ous state constitutions should make a very persuasive argu-
ment for those seeking to obtain federal judicial approval of
an asserted right. Furthermore, broad state judicial recogni-
tion of a claimed freedom should be an important indication
of the "roots" of society. In those states which included a
ninth amendment type of provision in their declaration of
rights, such judicial determinations should be even more rele-
vant.88
By historical definition, in the context of personal free-
dom for Americans, natural rights have always been viewed
as a product of Anglo-American political and social develop-
ment. But because the doctrine of natural rights, or perhaps
more accurately constitutional rights, is a changing concept,
there is no reason to so limit the "sources" of human freedom.
The adoption in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights by the United Nations General Assembly gave world-
wide recognition to several political and civil rights which are
not enumerated in the first eight amendments. While these
"new" natural rights, like the economic and social rights con-
tained in the Declaration, 89 are statements of what freedoms
88 Presently, 36 of the state constitutions contain a ninth
amendment type of provision. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art.
II, § 33.
[Vol. 8, No. I
34
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 8 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol8/iss1/2
NINTH AMENDMENT
each man ought to have rather than the rights he presently
possesses, they represent a consensus of universal moral pre-
cepts of paramount importance, ". . . categorical rights no-
body could find any excuse for not respecting." 90 The test for
fundamental human rights of the Declaration squarely meets
the requirements of Griswold. Some of the Declaration's na-
tural rights are already encompassed by the ninth amendment.
Those that have not as yet been "discovered" deserve serious
consideration in the future.
TI- NnTH A .m: 'rN SINCE 1965
Whether the correct interpretation of the scope of Gris-
wold should be strictly limited to the specific factual circum-
stances of the case-the right of marital privacy-or whether,
as suggested, the several opinions could form the basis for
broad new protections under the first, fifth, ninth and four-
teenth amendments, the result of the decision has been an
assertion, both in a judicial setting and by constitutional seers,
of an extensive panoply of novel fundamental personal rights.
The sheer number of reported decisions9 1 indicates widespread
use of the ninth amendment as one of the constitutional bases
for protection of individual freedoms, and dispels the gloomy
forecast that "there remains grave doubt that t h e Ninth
89 Economic and social rights include the right to a decent
standard of living, to equal pay for equal work, and to a
free basic education.
90 M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HumAN RIGHTS? 37 (1962).
01 State trial court rulings and many federal district court
decisions are not accompanied by a written opinion. These
decisions are not published, and thus are not a source of
information. Furthermore, even in the reported cases, ninth
amendment claims may have been raised but ignored by
the court in its opinion, either because the asserted right
found protection under other amendments, the ninth being
deemed unnecessary, or because the ninth amendment was
determined to be inapplicable.
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Amendment has a significant future."92 The current success
ratio for asserted ninth amendment rights has been so phe-
nomenally large that an attorney today would almost be dere-
lict if he did not at least include the amendment in his claim
for constitutional guarantees of the particular personal free-
dom being advocated.
In analyzing post-Griswold decisions, it must be remem-
bered that the Supreme Court, in construing other amend-
ments, has historically protected certain familial rights which
it deemed to be fundamental. These freedoms fall under the
broad right of privacy, and in each instance the Court made
the required determination that the governmental authority
had no compelling interest to abridge that basic right. Such
family interests as the right to send children to a private
school93 and the right to teach foreign languages in public
schools94 have been protected. In 1942, the Supreme Court
held the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act un-
constitutional as violative of the basic right to marry and have
offspring.9 5 Shortly after Griswold, the Court, in a case in-
validating the Virginia anti-miscegenation statute, determined
that freedom to marry was a fundamental family right.90 Thus,
Griswold was precedentially sound in affording constitutional,
if not ninth amendment, protection to matters primarily of
private family concern.
The most important outgrowth of the extension of marital
privacy following Griswold has been the repeatedly declared
claim that restrictive state criminal abortion laws violate the
ninth amendment right of a woman, married or single, to
92 Emerson, supra note 69, at 227. Professor Emerson, one of
the attorneys representing Griswold, believed that the de-
velopment of the ninth amendment was "some decades"
away.
03 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
94 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
95 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
96 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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choose whether or not to have children. This right, it is argued,
follows from the right of privacy in matters related to marri-
age, family and sex, and as applied to the doctor-patient re-
lationship, forbids undue limitations on the type of treatment
which may be prescribed. Former Justice Tom Clark, one of
the members of the Court which decided Griswold, believes
that since 1965, an entire "zone of individual privacy" exists
around the "marriage, home, children and day-to-day living
habits," fully protected by the ninth amendment, unless the
state or federal government clearly demonstrates a compelling
interest which outweighs these individual rights. "This is
one of the most fundamental concepts that the Founding
Fathers had in mind when they drafted the Constitution."
97
He finds the question of abortion, except under certain limit-
ed circumstances, to be a matter to be determined entirely
between the woman, her physician and other counsellors, free
from substantial abridgment by the state under its criminal
sanctions.
The constitutionality of abortion statutes has been chal-
lenged before various state an d federal courts, on several
grounds. Some tribunals, even though invalidating the law,
have declined to use the ninth amendment as a basis for their
decision. 98 Others have held abortion laws unprotected by the
ninth amendment.9 9 But several significant federal and state
court rulings have extended ninth amendment coverage to
strike down state abortion statutes which were unduly restric-
tive. A three judge federal district court,100 citing Griswold,
07 Clark, Religion, Morality and Abortion; A Constitutional
Appraisal, 2 LOYOLA U. (L.A.) L. REv. 1, 8 (1969).
11 People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr.
354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
19 Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F.
Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp.
741 (N.D. Ohio 1970); State v. Scott, 255 So. 2d 736 (La.
1971).
100 Normally a federal district court composed of three judges
is necessary under federal law to rule upon the constitu-
tionality of a state statute.
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found the Texas abortion statutes unconstitutional on their
face as violative of the right, secured by the ninth amend-
ment, "of choice over events which, by their character and
consequences, bear in a fundamental manner on the privacy
of individuals."' 01 The Georgia and Wisconsin laws w e r e
similarly determined to violate a pregnant woman's ninth
amendment right of privacy.102 The trial court, in the Wiscon-
sin case, reaffirmed the concept of privacy as it relates to the
home, and justified the application of the ninth amendment
to the abortion laws; stating that:
Obviously, there is no topic more closely interwoven
with the intimacy of the home and marriage than
that which relates to the conception and bearing of
progeny.10 3
The consensus of the judges who conclude that highly re-
strictive abortion laws violate the ninth amendment guaran-
tees is that such statutes, in the language of Griswold, operate
directly on the intimate relation of husband and wife "and
have a maximum destructive impact on that relationship."'0 4
Thus,
While the Ninth Amendment right to choose to have
an abortion is not unqualified or unfettered, a statute
designed to regulate the circumstances of abortions
must restrict its scope to compelling state interests. 0 5
Proponents of many other "fundamental" personal free-
doms, unenumerated in the Constitution, have urged protec-
tion under the ninth amendment. Some of the claims have in-
volved crucial issues, some trivial. Some are logical Griswold
"emanations," some wholly new demands without real or
101 Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
102 Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Babbitz
v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), vacated on
other grounds, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
103 Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293, 299 (E.D. Wis. 1970),
vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
104 381 U.S. at 485.
10, Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
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even tangential precedent. The twofold importance of these
decisions merits at least a brief summary of the rulings of
the more important cases. For not only do these decisions de-
fine and shape the "new" post-Griswold ninth amendment,
they also have established certain new freedoms protected by
the amendment.
Perhaps one of the most pressing matters concerning to-
day's teenagers is school dress and hair codes. Being append-
ages of the state, these regulations clearly bear the mark of
state action and must not violate federal constitutional limita-
tions. The earliest federal case came from Louisiana, soon
after Griswold. A student argued that the school regulation
prescribing hair length violated the ninth amendment and
other amendments. The court discussed Griswold and conclud-
ed that the regulation was permissible since, first, the assert-
ed right was not based on privacy nor did it emanate from
other specific rights and, second, the "right of free choice
of grooming" was not so sacred as to be classified as funda-
mental. 06 But a federal district court in Vermont ruled that
106 Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967). See
also Bishop v. Colaw, 316 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Mo. 1970),
rev'd 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Freeman v. Flake, 320
F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Utah 1970), affd 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir.
1971); Valdes v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 325
F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified
School Dist., 319 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Cal. 1970); Neuhaus
v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Gere v. Stan-
ley, 320 F. Supp. 852 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Karr v. Schmidt,
320 F. Supp. 728 (W.D. Tex. 1970); Miller v. Gillis, 315 F.
Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1969). A more serious "hair" case was
brought by a National Guard member who had been de-
clared an unsatisfactory participant at three reserve meet-
ings for failure to maintain a "neat and soldierly appear-
ance". This resulted in his being called to active duty.
While the court noted that, as a civilian, the plaintiff's
ninth amendment claims would merit serious considera-
tion, it ruled that there is no ninth amendment right of
personal appearance for the military. Anderson v. Laird,
437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1971). An interesting dissent empha-
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a school code of dress prescribing hair length and style is an
unconstitutional intrusion into the broad category of funda-
mental personal liberty, and absent a compelling state inter-
est, violates the ninth and other amendments.107 While the
decisions are about equally divided 08 as to whether personal
grooming and dress fashions are fundamental rights within
the Griswold standards, since other issues are more pressing,
it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will see fit to re-
solve the conflict.10 9
sized the respect which the ninth amendment rights must
be accorded in the domain of a citizen's private life.
107 Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970); accord,
Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1971); Richards
v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Berryman v.
Hein, 329 F. Supp. 616 (D. Idaho 1971); Martin v. Davison,
322 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Dawson v. Hillsborough
Co., Florida School Bd., 322 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Fla. 1971);
Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114 (D. Conn. 1970); Murphy
v. Pocatello School Dist. #25, 480 P.2d 878 (Idaho 1971).
103 Many personal appearance cases have been decided under
the first or fourteenth amendments. Only those rulings
listed in notes 106 and 107 have utilized the ninth amend-
ment as a basis for the decision.
109 The Supreme Court denied review in Olff v. East Side
Union High School Dist., 40 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S., Jan. 17,
1972). Noting the irreconcilable conflict in the federal court
decisions, Justice Douglas strongly dissented. He urged that
the Court should decide the issue, suggesting that since
Griswold the ninth amendment protection of "liberty" in-
cludes safeguarding the right of personal taste:
One's hair style, like one's taste for food, or one's liking
for certain kinds of music, art, reading, recreation, is
certainly fundamental in our constitutional scheme-a
scheme designed to keep government off the backs of
people. 40 U.S.L.W. at 3332.
Review has been denied in two other cases, one of which
sustained, and the other overruled, the school board. Breen
v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
937 (1970); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
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When the asserted right has a substantial relation to pri-
vacy, the courts have been much more receptive to claims for
ninth amendment protection. In reviewing the dismissal of
a teacher grounded on a charge of immorality, a court ruled
that a letter from the teacher to a former student, which
contained coarse vulgarities, was protected as a private com-
munication under the ninth amendment and reinstated the
teacher.10 Similarly, when a postmaster terminated an em-
ployee because he was living with a woman to whom he was
not married, a federal court held that such action, based on
the private sex life of the employee, violated his ninth amend-
ment right of privacy."' Based on the right of privacy, a fed-
eral district court in Arizona recently protected the profes-
sional and business reputations of defendants from adverse
pre-trial publicity which might have arisen from inadmissi-
ble evidence in a criminal case,1 2 and the Supreme Court of
California prevented the disclosure of personal financial in-
formation required by ordinance of every public officer and
candidate." 3
Generally, the courts have rejected requests for ninth
amendment protection of suggested fundamental rights which
bear little relationship to "the conscience of our people" or
the right of privacy. Such legislation as the federal Gun Con-
trol Act of 1968,"1 the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan
110 Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City School Dist., 233
N.E.2d 143 (Ohio C.P. 1967).
' Mindel v. U.S. Civil Service Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485
(N.D. Cal. 1970). See also Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (where dismissal for immorality, not af-
fecting the employee's job, was reversed); Morrison v.
State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969) (where the court
recognized that a general ban on immoral conduct would
raise serious ninth amendment privacy questions).
112 Hooper v. Gooding, 282 F. Supp. 624 (D. Ariz. 1968).
1"3 City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225 (Cal.
1970).
"14 United States v. Mathews, 438 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Development Act,115 state marijuana laws,110 crash helmet
statutes" 71 and a law permitting the sale of vehicle registra-
tion lists to junk mail distributors"8 have been held not to
violate the ninth amendment right of privacy. Claims that the
Selective Service Act is an unconstitutional interference with
the unenumerated "right to life," as guaranteed by the ninth
amendment, have been summarily rejected.119 Neither con-
finement of a state prison inmate in maximum security,120
confinement in overcrowded jail facilities resulting in physical
and homosexual attacks,121 a statute prohibiting transporta-
tion or possession of a dangerous weapon during a declared
state of emergency under an emergency curfew ordinance, 122
a law providing that automobile drivers must consent to a
chemical test to determine the alcohol content of his blood, 2 3
a regulation requiring applicants for real estate salesman's or
115 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3301-13 (1970). Benson v. City of Minne-
apolis, 286 F. Supp. 614 (D. Minn. 1968).
118 Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898 (Mass. 1969); Miller
v. State, 458 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
117 State v. Edwards, 177 N.W.2d 40 (Minn. 1970); State v.
Fetterly, 456 P.2d 996 (Ore. 1969). But see American Motor-
cycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968),
where the court ruled that the Michigan Crash Helmet
Statute bore no relationship to public health, safety and
welfare and therefore infringed on the ninth amendment
right to be let alone.
218 Lamont v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
19 United States v. Diaz, 427 F.2d 636 (1st Cir. 1970); United
States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Pa. 1970). In United
States v. Dorris, 319 F. Supp. 1306 (W.D. Pa. 1970), the
court ruled that the right to life was a fifth, not ninth,
amendment freedom. See also United States v. Uhl, 436
F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1970).
120 Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970).
121 Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971).
122 Bright v. Nunn, 448 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1971); State v. Dob-
bins, 178 S.E.2d 449 (N.C. 1971).
12 People v. Fidler, 485 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1971); People v.
Brown, 485 P.2d 500 (Colo. 1971).
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broker's licenses to be fingerprinted,124 nor a statute prohibit-
ing public distribution of obscene materials, 125 violates the
amendment. The asserted right to engage in political activity,
which received a hint of recognition in the Hatch Act case, 28
has received unfavorable treatment in two post-Griswold de-
cisions. In one case, the statute was again held not to violate
the ninth amendment.12 7 In the other ruling, the court held
that the "fairness doctrine" of section 315 of the Federal Com-
munications Act of 1934128 did not infringe on the right to en-
gage in political activity because free time to respond was
required.129 Other declared fundamental freedoms which have
been rebuffed as ninth amendment guaranteed rights include
the right to teach in the public schools, 30 the right to waive
jury trial without governmental consent,131 the right to be
free from eavesdropping and recording of conversations in a
criminal case, 32 and the right to sue the federal government.
133
In a recent decision, a United States Court of Appeals ruled
that, as against the federal government, the State of Arizona
had no fundamental right, under the ninth amendment, to
124 Hamilton v. New Jersey Real Estate Comm'n, 117 N.J.
Super. 345, 284 A.2d 564 (Super. Ct. 1971).
125 Gornto v. State, 178 S.E.2d 894 (Ga. 1970).
126 See note 27 supra and the accompanying text.
127 Fishkin v. U.S. Civil Service Comm'n, 309 F. Supp. 40 (N.D.
Cal. 1969).
128 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1962).
129 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C.
Cir. 1967), affd 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
130 Ahren v. Board of Educ., 327 F. Supp. 1391 (D. Neb. 1971).
131 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
132 United States v. Kahn, 251 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
But see Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
188 Gardner v. United States, 446 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1971). In
this case the court rejected the claim that the right to sue
the United States Government was carried over, by the
ninth amendment, from the common law "Petition of
Right" against the king.
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assert on behalf of its citizens claims of unfair treatment by
a federal agency. 18 4
One of the most interesting, if not the most critical, of
the post-Griswold cases involved a local ordinance which pro-
hibited participation in, or presence at, a cockfighting exhibi-
tion. The defendant, apparently unable to find any historical
basis to assert a long standing unenumerated right relating
to cockfighting, claimed that the ordinance violated his free-
dom of movement, which he argued was part of the broad
right of privacy. 8 5 The Supreme Court of Hawaii, where cock-
fighting may have deep roots, struck down the statute as an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy guaranteed
by the ninth amendment. 30 The curious, and perhaps most
consequential, aspect of the decision was the language used
in a concurring opinion. After concluding that t h e ninth
amendment was most definitely a "source" of substantive
rights, the judge stated:
The Ninth Amendment is a reservoir of personal
rights necessary to preserve the dignity and existence
of men in a free society.... [T]he Ninth Amendment
is the place to which we must turn for protection of
individual liberty from infringements not enumerated,
and perhaps not contemplated, by the founding fath-
ers.137 (Emphasis added).
It is hard to conceive of a more dynamic concept of the ninth
amendment. 8S
'3 Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Department of
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 449 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1971).
18' This should not be confused with the right to travel, which
has long been recognized as occupying "a position funda-
mental to the concept of our Federal Union." United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
'36 State v. Abellano, 441 P.2d 333 (Hawaii 1968).
'37 Id. at 337, 339.
188 Even applying the more restrictive Griswold standards, it
would be difficult to defend this decision and the language
of the concurring opinion from Justice Black's admonitions
against judge-made law.
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THE FUTURE or =m NnqTR AmmmE
The development of the ninth amendment, especially
since the TVA cases, displays a rapid expansion of its protec-
tion for personal rights, consistent with the concept of a dy-
namic constitution. However, certain asserted freedoms have
not met the Griswold test of fundamentalness, and thus have
not been accorded constitutional safeguard from governmental
infringement. With a working knowledge of the well-estab-
lished, albeit rather elusive and subjective Griswold guide-
lines, and with some notion of acceptable sources for the re-
pository of natural rights, we can engage in responsible specu-
lation as to the nature of "other" unenumerated rights which
courts may properly accord ninth amendment protection.139
In this concluding section, while we will caution that theoreti-
cal development will have to ultimately await clarifying de-
cisions of the Supreme Court, we will suggest, first, that there
is ample potential for near term growth of ninth amendment
protections, substantially within Griswold standards; and, sec-
ond, that erosion of the Griswold requirements will probably
occur, as Justice Black warned, resulting in further applica-
tion of the ninth amendment.
The impact of Griswold, whether or not merited, has been
incalculable. Without its prestige, the ninth amendment may
have withered. Now revitalized, it must be actively promoted
to prevent its slipping back into obscurity. Further judicial
recognition is the only certain method to sustain the amend-
ment's importance. In seeking protection for unenumerated
personal freedoms, those which meet the Griswold tests for
139 Whether the "due process" and "equal protection" limita-
tions on governmental action, plus the "penumbras" of the
first eight amendments with their even more ambiguous
terminology, will continue to provide the principal safe-
guards for human rights, placing the ninth amendment in
a role of limited importance, is less ponderable. Because
the ninth amendment is a more direct and facile receptacle
for some personal liberties, it should continue to develop
its own special role.
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fundamentalness should logically receive the most favorable
reception by the judiciary. Of these, the basic liberties which
are supported by substantial historical antecedents are most
likely to be accorded protection, if at all, under the ninth
amendment.140
One of the most hallowed natural rights of man was the
right to be free from the potential oppressiveness of a peace
time army. In almost every charter of government from the
English Bill of Rights through the colonial and post-revolu-
140 A pre-Griswold recognition of a fundamental unenu-
merated right with historical antecedents can be found in
Thiede v. Town of Scandia Valley, 14 N.W.2d 400 (Minn.
1944). In construing a state constitutional provision similar
to the ninth amendment, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held invalid a statute permitting removal of paupers from
their homestead to a poor relief settlement without their
consent. The court declared that each man has a long stand-
ing fundamental right to occupy his own home irrespective
of wealth:
The fact that the declaration in Magna Carta that no
man shall be disseized of his freehold except for crime
was not incorporated in our Constitution does not pre-
vent us from recognizing that principle as one of fun-
damental law, for as was said in Town of Dummerston
v. Town of Newfane ... supra: ".... the rule forbid-
ding the removal of a person as a pauper from his
freehold estate is a rule of humanity and policy ...
It is a rule resting upon the best feelings of our na-
ture for its foundation, and we think that the provi-
visions in Magna Charta, which has been referred to,
was intended not so much to confer a new privilege
as to recognize one already existing."
14 N.W.2d at 406. But see In re Reitz, 191 N.W.2d 913 (Wis.
1971), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a
statute authorizing the return to his legal settlement of
a dependent person who is receiving relief at another place
in the state does not violate the right of privacy under the
ninth amendment. The dependent person had lived in Mil-
waukee for four years when his town of legal settlement
for relief purposes instituted the suit to force him to re-
turn or face the loss of the benefits.
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tionary documents, man sought to prohibit the central regime
from maintaining an army when unnecessary for protection
against foreign dangers. Its absence from the governing docu-
ment often was met by strong protest.14 1 While draft laws
have been consistently held to be constitutional, they may be
subject to serious challenge if continued beyond the current
"war." Although the courts will assuredly give "peace time"
a narrow definition, and respond favorably to the claim of
"compelling governmental interest," a preventive army in the
absence of any current or imminent conflict, may violate a
presently unrevealed ninth amendment guarantee against un-
duly large peace time armies. The combined danger to per-
sonal freedoms and the enormous economic drain inherent in
a substantial military force should support historical ninth
amendment arguments. 1'
During the course of the ratification conventions, several
states became concerned that the increased powers granted
to the central government would permit it to bestow broad
economic licenses and privileges upon favored groups. Four
states proposed that the Bill of Rights contain a provision
prohibiting the creation of monopolies by the federal govern-
ment. One additional state included such a provision in its
own Declaration of Rights. While the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the Department of Justice have the responsibility
to prevent monopolies created through private manipulations,
no such congressional sanctions exist against the federal or
state governments. Any government authorized monopoly
141 1 DEBATES, supra note 82, at 370-71, 496 (Luther Martin's
letter to the Maryland Legislature and George Mason's
objections to the Constitution).
142 But see United States v. Uhl, 436 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1970)
(which held that the draft law, even during the absence
of a dire national emergency, did not violate the ninth
amendment); accord, United States v. Sowul, 447 F.2d 1103
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Zaugh, 445 F.2d 300 (9th
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should be subject to a ninth amendment challenge to the ex-
tent that a compelling overriding interest for such activity
cannot clearly be established. In addition, a government mo-
nopoly might itself be unconstitutional. For example, exclu-
sive governmental ownership and operation of all passenger
railroad service, even though perhaps economically advisable,
might impermissibly conflict with an individual's right not
to be subjected to the evils of centralized control. In spite of
the broad powers of Congress under the commerce clause,
the ninth amendment may yet serve as a protection against
either form of governmental monopoly.
Newer "non-historical" fundamental rights, in accordance
with the concept of a dynamic Constitution, equally deserve
ninth amendment consideration. Griswold granted protection
to privacy, a relative late-comer to the personal rights arena.
If it is true that ". . . the door is wide open for the results
of research, the proper construction of this Amendment, and
enumeration of the rights [with] which the Government or
anyone, has no power to interfere,' '143 then newly demanded
political and civil rights must be carefully examined both for
their validity and potential coverage by the ninth amendment.
Particularly significant in the field of expanding human free-
doms is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the
United Nations which contains several important civil liber-
ties not enumerated in our Bill of Rights. Article 12 specifi-
cally prohibits arbitrary interference with privacy, the family,
home and correspondence; article 14 recognizes the right to
political asylum; and article 16 acknowledges that freedom
to marry and have a family is fundamental. By signing the
Declaration, the United States government presumably ad-
heres to the concept that all people should possess those free-
doms. Assuming these rights are of paramount importance
because they are included in the Declaration, they should
14 Hanlin, The Bill of Rights or the First Ten Amendments
to the United States Constitution, 68 CoM. L.J. 236 (1963).
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therefore logically find judicial recognition and support based
upon the ninth amendment.
Economic and social rights, unknown to the development
of natural rights, are also a part of the Declaration of Human
Rights. Because political and civil rights can mean so little
to the economically deprived citizen, a court should be recep-
tive to the assertion that the ninth amendment guarantees
a decent standard of living to every man, the import of ar-
ticle 25 of the Declaration. The struggle for a better life for
the migrant workers, residents in Appalachia and prisoners
in ghetto slums might find favorable judicial reaction to the
advocacy of ninth amendment sanctions. 4 4
The greatest area of potential growth for the ninth amend-
ment is in the expansion of the "zone of privacy" conceived
by Justice Clark. The amendment should mature through its
dual role of striking down existing statutory incursions into
the zone and guarding against any new governmental attempts
at interference with the private sector of a citizen's life. With-
in the Griswold framework, the ninth amendment should serve
as the basis for denial of enforcement by federal and state
agencies of laws and regulations which restrict private con-
duct concerning which the government has no specific over-
riding interest.
Foremost among the advocates of broader ninth amend-
144 One current writer views the economic sphere as the most
significant area for the development of ninth amendment
rights. He suggests that the right to work is an important
freedom that deserves ninth amendment protection. Kent,
Under the Ninth Amendment What- Rights are the "Others
Retained by the People?", 29 FED. B.J. 219 (1970). Because
these economic "rights" have, to a large extent, already
received meaningful recognition and protection through
congressional action and fourteenth amendment interpre-
tations, it would appear that the role of the ninth amend-
ment in the economic domain might be better suited to
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ment application to privacy are individuals who engage in
"abnormal" sexual conduct. Long the subject of severe crimi-
nal penalties, homosexuals have been urging publicly and in
the courts that statutes which restrict consensual private
sexual conduct violate the ninth amendment. They challenge
the validity of criminal laws which prohibit sodomy, fornica-
tion, cohabitation and homosexual relations between consent-
ing adults in private. Arguing that they are as much entitled
to the privacy protections of Griswold as are married cou-
ples, they assert that the state has no justification for such
restrictions, much less an overriding and compelling reason.
The initial results of their pleas indicate judicial receptive-
ness to these arguments. Two recent decisions by three-judge
federal district courts have ruled that the Indiana and Texas
sodomy statutes are unconstitutional, at least insofar as they
reach the private consensual acts of married couples.145 While
both cases involved only first and fourteenth amendment
claims for privacy, both the "zone of privacy" concept and
the language of the court in Buchanan v. BatcheZor146 create
a persuasive argument that the ninth amendment protection
is appropriate. In defending its conclusion that the Texas
statute invaded personal liberties, the court stated:
Sodomy is not an act which has the approval of the
majority of the people. In fact such conduct is prob-
ably offensive to the vast majority, but such opinion
is not sufficient reason for the State to encroach upon
the liberty of married persons in their private con-
duct. Absent some demonstrable necessity, matters of
(good or bad) taste are to be protected from regu-
lation.147
145 Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968); Buchanan
v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated
on other grounds, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
146 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated on other grounds,
401 U.S. 989 (1971).
147 308 F. Supp. at 733. But see Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp.
1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (in which a federal judge in another
district in Texas held that the state sodomy laws were
constitutional and the ninth amendment inapplicable).
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Assuming that Griswold protects private sodomous con-
duct by married couples, there can be no logical reason why
the ninth amendment should not similarly restrain state pro-
bition of similar conduct, whether heterosexual or homo-
sexual. If private consensual sexual mores and conduct is
really to be private, and if the government really has no sub-
stantial compelling interest to override the fundamental right
of privacy, then the ninth amendment should surely offer pro-
tection from abridgment of that right.148
Although unable to command the reverence of Griswold,
the multitude of personal appearance cases, which have arisen
from individual challenges to high school dress codes, should
influence the development of the ninth amendment far be-
yond the immediate decision of reinstatement or exclusion of
the student. Pronouncements in these rulings extend the rath-
er narrow confines of family privacy protected under Gris-
wold, and vastly enlarge the concept of basic liberty. In one
of the "hair" cases, Richards v. Thurston,49 a federal circuit
court, probably responding to a suggestion that the asserted
right was trivial, proclaimed:
We do not say that the governance of the length and
style of one's hair is necessarily so fundamental as
those substantive rights already found implicit in the
"liberty" assurance of the Due Process Clause, requir-
ing a "compelling" showing by the state before it may
be impaired. Yet "liberty" seems to us an incomplete
protection if it encompasses only the right to do mo-
mentous acts, leaving the state free to interfere with
those personal aspects of our lives which have no di-
rict bearing on the ability of others to enjoy their
liberty ... Indeed, a narrower view of liberty in a
free society might, among other things, allow a state
148 It is clear that the Griswold right of privacy in the marital
domain is not without limits. The Supreme Court of Minne-
sota has recently held that a statute prohibiting marriage
of persons of the same sex does not violate the ninth amend-
ment. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
140 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
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to require a conventional coiffure of all its citizens,
a governmental power not unknown in European his-
tory. We think the Founding Fathers understood
themselves to have limited the government's power to
intrude into this sphere of personal liberty, by re-
serving some powers to the people.150
No longer will it be necessary, if Richards correctly re-
flects the present meaning of liberty under the ninth amend-
ment, to establish the hallmark of Griswold as the sine qua
non. A freedom may not have to be "momentous" to be en-
titled to ninth amendment protection. An asserted right need
not measure up to a basic principle which lies at the roots
of all our civil and political institutions. Black's warning was
prophetic, since the Richards decision speaks of liberty in the
ultra-subjective sense-as it "seems to us"-which is no more
than a euphemism for judge-made standards. Thus, in a radi-
cal departure, Richards discards the "fundamentalness" test
of Griswold for the less demanding standard of non-encroach-
ment. Under that doctrine, personal liberty is entitled to pro-
tection from governmental abridgment so long as the asserted
right has "no direct bearing on the ability of others to enjoy
their liberty." Building upon Richards, the Supreme Court of
Idaho, under similar circumstances, did not hesitate to broad-
en further the scope of the ninth amendment in the case of
Murphy v. Pocatello School Dist. #25: lt'
Neither from the words themselves nor from the rec-
ords and other contemporaneous material concerning
the creation of the Ninth Amendment is it exactly
clear what "rights" are retained by the people. What
is clear from an examination of the history and origin
of the Ninth Amendment is that the absence of a
specific constitutional provision dealing with the
rights of privacy, personal taste, the right to be left
alone, and the like, does not compel the conclusion
that no such right exists. On the contrary, the opposite
conclusion is compelled. As in the Fifth and Four-
10 Id. at 1284.
151 480 P.2d 878 (Idaho 1971).
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teenth Amendment due process cases which have in-
terpreted and necessarily expanded what life, liberty
and pursuit of happiness mean, the determination of
what rights exist and in which situations under the
broad and general language of the Ninth Amendment
is clearly, and again necessarily, left to judicial de-
termination. Therefore, under both the Idaho Con-
stitution. .. and under the Ninth Amendment of the
United States Constitution made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment (under Gris-
wold, supra), we hold the right to wear one's hair in
a manner of his choice to be a protected right of
personal taste not to be interfered with by the state
unless the state can meet the "substantial burden"
criteria similar to that set out in the cases holding in
favor of the student .... 152
Recently, conservationists have suggested that every man
has a fundamental right to a healthy environment and an
unpolluted wilderness.153 Others have asserted with equal vig-
or the right to an adequate old age pension, the freedom to
develop one's natural gifts to the fullest extent, and the right
to practice one's profession.154 From these preliminary state-
ments further coverage for the ninth amendment may be
sought. Just this year, in a case involving an incarcerated
black militant, the assertion was made that the ninth amend-
152 Id. at 883-84.
153 Beckman, The Right to a Decent Environment Under the
Ninth Amendment, 46 L.A.B. BULL. 415 (1971). Mr. Beck-
man contends that the ninth amendment protects inalien-
able rights "waiting for changing conditions of life to cause
them to surface in the society and demand protection."
Beckman, supra at 421. See also Roberts, An Environmental
Lawyer Urges: Plead the Ninth Amendment, 79 NATURAL
HISTORY 18 (1970). But one court, while sympathetic to
the environmentalists' pleas, rejects the ninth amendment
as a basis for relief. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
14 Grannis v. Board of Medical Examiners, 19 Cal. App. 3d
551, 96 Cal. Reptr. 863 (Ct. App. 1971).
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ment recognized "freedom from gratuitous humiliation at the
hands of the State."1 5
Richards and Murphy have added to the panoply of ninth
amendment coverage the rights of personal appearance and
personal taste, perhaps as offshoots of the right of privacy,
but certainly not limited to the Griswold familial setting. More
important, they have established precedent for total departure
from Griswold standards. A new base of operations has been
constructed in the sphere of privacy-that of personal taste.
If given wide judicial acceptance, the non-encroachment test
must result in an ever broadening expansion of personal liber-
ties. It is clear that vigorous post-Griswold development of
the ninth amendment protection continues. 15 6
Meaningful and lasting conceptual development of the
ninth amendment must ultimately await the slow process of
case by case rulings of the United States Supreme Court. Like
the gradual and continuing expansion of the scope of the four-
teenth amendment since its adoption in 1868, the ninth amend-
ment will finally mature only through decisions by the high
Court. Without discounting the importance of the rash of low-
er court decisions, their durability and influence are limited,
first, to the court's geographical jurisdiction and, second, be-
cause many of these decisions are diametrically opposite to
rulings by courts of equal stature.157 Until specific cases are
155 Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The
court did not rule on the ninth amendment claims pre-
sented in the case.
156 A conscientious objector group attempted to expand the
concept of privacy by suing the Secretary of Defense to
obtain an injunction prohibiting surveillance by the army
of civilian political activity. An appellate court has ruled
that a claim for relief has been properly stated, and has
remanded the case to the trial court for hearing. Tatum v.
Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
157 This divergence is especially pronounced in the personal
appearance and abortion cases. Three of the several abor-
tion cases which have been appealed have been argued
before the Supreme Court and should be decided this term.
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decided by the Supreme Court, we can only forecast develop-
ments with a conviction tempered by the unpredictable. While
Madison understood (and it is accepted constitutional dogma
today), that new situations would arise which would need the
protection of the Bill of Rights, and while the historic guide-
lines-maximum individual freedom consistent with the com-
pelling needs of the government-should continue to receive
judicial recognition, the probable response of the Supreme
Court to specific post-Griswold developments is at best con-
jectural.
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